政策应将保护从成品棒材转向质量、含铁原料和公平贸易

10.1 Why steel policy matters for the external accounts

Iron and steel are a material item in Cameroon’s trade balance. Imports of chapters 72 and 73 cost 295.8 bn FCFA in 2023, 240.3 bn FCFA in 2024 and 278.1 bn FCFA in 2025, between 13.0% and 14.8% of the merchandise trade deficit in each year (derived) [S115][S107][S07]. The deficit itself widened to 2,145.2 bn FCFA in 2025, with a cover ratio of exports to imports of 59.0% [S07]. In the CEMAC monetary union, foreign-exchange reserves fell to 6,377.3 bn FCFA at the end of 2025, equivalent to 4.2 months of imports [S113].

Source: INS, notes on foreign trade 2023, 2024 and 2025 (provisional) [S115][S107][S07]. Shares derived.

The composition matters more than the total. About half of the chapter 72 bill is billets, which domestic mills turn into bars [S05]. Substituting imported bars, as the 2016 ban did, saved little foreign exchange because the iron was still imported; substituting imported iron units would save much more. Policy aimed at the external accounts should therefore look upstream.

10.2 The policy framework today

The framework that applies to steel combines national strategy, investment incentives, trade measures and sector regulation.

At the level of strategy, SND30 lists mines-métallurgie-sidérurgie among its nine priority industrial sub-sectors and calls for accelerating import substitution while expanding exports [S25]. It sets a target of manufacturing value added of 25% of GDP by 2030; the national accounts give about 13.3% in 2025 (derived) [S25][S16]. The industrialisation master plan of 2016 to 2017, which emphasised metallurgy and steel, is under revision, which offers a window to update its steel chapter [S171][S172]. The government’s import-substitution plan for 2024 to 2026, PIISAH, covers agricultural, livestock and fisheries products only and does not include steel [S173].

For investment, Law No. 2013/004 of 18 April 2013 on private investment incentives provides exemptions for up to five years during establishment and up to ten years of operation, and expressly lists the iron and steel industry among the priority sectors for specific incentives [S142]. The ports of Douala and Kribi are classified as economic zones, while industrial free-zone status requires 80% of output to be exported, which would not suit a producer serving the domestic market [S142].

For trade and regulation, the instruments are the rebar import suspension of 2016, reaffirmed in 2023; the mandatory standard NC 236/2024/06; price homologation by the Ministry of Commerce; the CEMAC common external tariff; the national preference article of the 2025 Finance Law; and a new environmental tax of 5,000 FCFA per tonne on reinforcing bar from 2026 [S04][S56][S26][S24][S23][S137][S124].

10.3 Trade measures: from an open-ended ban to rules-based instruments

The rebar suspension rests on administrative correspondence: a letter from the Prime Minister’s office of 31 May 2016 and a customs note of 3 April 2023 that cites a presidential instruction [S04][S56]. It has been effective in building domestic rolling capacity, but it has three weaknesses. It is open-ended and discretionary, so investors cannot rely on it and derogations, such as those sought for large contractors, undermine it [S04]. It protects one product only, leaving the iron units on which the industry depends, and the heavy sections and flat products it does not make, fully exposed. And it reduces competition in a market where prices are already administered.

The tariff schedule has its own inconsistency. Under the CEMAC tariff reported for 2023, iron ore, direct-reduced iron, scrap, billets, hot-rolled coil and most sections paid 10%; reinforcing bar and some structures 20%; galvanised sheet 30%; and wire rod only 5% [S23]. Wire rod, a finished product rolled from billets, therefore paid half the duty of the billets themselves. The same schedule taxes the iron units of a melt shop: section 8.6 shows that the 10% duty on imported scrap and hot-briquetted iron, about US$47 to 52 per tonne of billet, is roughly the margin by which a billet melted at Kribi trails an imported one at October 2026 prices.

Source: World Bank WITS, Cameroon reported applied MFN tariffs, 2023 [S23]. The harmonised CEEAC-CEMAC tariff applied from 1 January 2026 has not yet been published by line for steel [S131].

Cameroon has wide legal room to adjust its tariffs: only 0.2% of its non-agricultural tariff lines are bound at the World Trade Organization, so steel duties are effectively unbound [S174]. But tariffs are set at the CEMAC level, and the harmonised CEEAC-CEMAC tariff that has applied since 1 January 2026 is still being implemented [S131]. Any change requires regional agreement.

The experience of other countries suggests what works. Egypt has used provisional duties with minimum specific amounts, such as a 13% billet duty with a minimum of US$65 per tonne from April 2026, to stabilise its market while keeping imports possible [S53][S54]. South Africa’s provisional safeguard on hot-rolled coil lapsed after 200 days, and shortly afterwards its main producer decided to wind down its long-steel business, citing weak protection among other factors [S55][S61]. Algeria combined protection with large investments in gas-based iron and became a net exporter [S57][S28]. The common lesson is that trade measures work best when they are transparent, time-bound, product-specific and accompanied by investment in competitive capacity.

10.4 Standards and quality: from rebar to structural steel

Standards are the instrument with the least fiscal cost and the most direct effect on safety. Cameroon has made a reinforcing-bar standard mandatory since 2022 and enforced it, including through ANOR’s sanction of a producer for Fe450 bars in 2024; in January 2026 the Prime Minister’s office refused to revise it [S26][S110]. Consumer complaints and reports of counterfeit bars show that enforcement remains a challenge [S111][S80].

Three steps would strengthen this lever. Mandatory standards and conformity assessment could be extended to structural sections, hollow sections, wire products and roofing sheet, which are increasingly used in public buildings and infrastructure and are today imported or produced without a common reference. Testing capacity, including accredited laboratories for tensile and chemical testing, would support enforcement; SND30 already calls for laboratory upgrades [S25]. And standards could be harmonised at the CEMAC level, so that certified products from any member state can circulate freely, which would also support the rules of origin of the African Continental Free Trade Area.

10.5 Public procurement: the State as the largest steel buyer

The State is the largest single buyer of steel through its public investment budget, 2,026.3 bn FCFA in 2026, and the road programme of the Ministry of Public Works, 740 bn FCFA [S17][S76]. Procurement rules shape demand more directly than trade measures.

Article 8 of the 2025 Finance Law introduced a national preference: imported goods for which a local equivalent exists lose their customs facilities, with exceptions for goods under the economic partnership agreements with the European Union and the United Kingdom, the African Continental Free Trade Area, CEMAC and CEEAC, and for certified shortages; the stated objective is to limit foreign-exchange outflows [S137]. Applied to steel, the measure could favour local products in public works, but its effect depends on how "equivalent" is defined. A rule that required certified products in public works, published the steel quantities of large tenders in advance and allowed local producers to bid for supply packages would support domestic sections and structures as well as bars.

Procurement also depends on payment. The Minister of Public Works acknowledged in 2026 that cash-flow tensions were affecting payments to contractors [S76]. Contractor arrears are passed on to their steel suppliers. Timely payment is the most effective procurement measure a government can take for its domestic industry.

10.6 Local content, iron units and incentives

The most important policy choice for the next decade is whether to encourage domestic iron-making. Several instruments already point that way.

The Mining Code, Law No. 2023/014 of 19 December 2023, reserves 95% of non-skilled jobs in mining for nationals and requires priority for Cameroonian subcontractors [S175]. It also requires each mining convention to set out how a share of production, at least 15%, is made available for local transformation (the text of the law is cited in White paper 01). Project conventions apply that rule: the convention for the Mbalam deposit is reported to provide for 15% of production to be transformed locally (the same press report presents a national steel hub as part of the programme), and the Kribi-Lobé convention reserves 15% for the local market [S34][S35]. These clauses could become a significant source of iron units if they are translated into practical supply arrangements, technical specifications and timelines.

The 2013 investment law already lists iron and steel as a priority sector [S142]. Incentives could be focused on the activities that close the gap, namely melting, direct reduction and section rolling, rather than on additional rolling of products already in surplus. Scrap policy matters too: no legal ban on scrap exports was found, although recorded exports fell to near zero after 2019 [S05][S123]. Formalising scrap collection, with traceability and environmental standards, would improve both supply and data.

Energy is part of industrial policy for steel. A melt shop or direct reduction plant is a large, steady electricity load. A published framework for high-voltage industrial supply above 10 MW, which does not exist today, and timely completion of transmission links would help every energy-intensive industry [S93][S92]. White paper 05, Chapter 10, sets out the rules such a framework would need.

Table 10.1 derivedPolicy levers for the steel sector, current state and options

Source: Cameroon Steel analysis [S04][S56][S23][S131][S26][S137][S34][S35][S142][S24][S123][S93][S92][S05].

10.7 Lessons from neighbours and peers

Cameroon’s neighbours and peers offer recent examples of steel policy. Gabon reduced VAT on locally made reinforcing bar from 10% to 3% in July 2026, a fiscal preference rather than a ban, in support of new mills at Nkok and Port-Gentil [S29][S21][S30]. Egypt protects its market with duties that combine a percentage with a minimum amount per tonne, applied to billets and hot-rolled coil after investigation [S53][S54]. Algeria combined import management with very large investments in gas-based iron and steel and moved from deficit to surplus in four years [S57][S28]. South Africa’s experience shows the limits of protection when energy, logistics and feedstock policy fail [S61].

Two features distinguish successful cases. Protection was linked to investment in competitive capacity, so that it was temporary in effect if not always in law. And it was applied through instruments that investors could read in advance: published duties, investigations with defined procedures and time limits, and clear rules on feedstock. Cameroon’s rebar ban has delivered the first, in the form of new rolling capacity, but not the second.

10.8 Data as a public good

Several of the uncertainties in this paper would disappear if Cameroon published an annual steel balance: domestic production by product, imports and exports by product and apparent use. The data exist, in customs records and in producers’ accounts, but they are not assembled. A balance compiled by the statistics institute with the industry associations, and published each year, would allow the government to monitor import surges, evaluate trade measures, plan public procurement and track progress towards the SND30 objectives. It would also help lenders and investors assess projects on a common basis. It is the cheapest of all the levers discussed here, and it would improve the use of every other one.

10.9 Fiscal and macroeconomic limits

Every lever must respect the macroeconomic constraints. The IMF found a 2025 non-oil primary deficit of 2.6% of GDP against a target of 1.4% and assesses a high overall risk of debt distress; its post-financing assessment will go to its Board in December 2026 [S82][S36]. Tax exemptions will be scrutinised, which argues for incentives that are targeted, time-bound and transparent. CEMAC’s reserves, at 4.2 months of imports at the end of 2025, and the requirement for central-bank authorisation of transfers above 50m FCFA, make foreign-exchange availability a constraint for importers and investors alike [S113][S142]. The 2026 Finance Law also prohibits purchases from foreign suppliers without an effective transfer of funds [S136].

These constraints strengthen rather than weaken the case for iron-unit substitution. Domestic iron reduces the foreign-exchange cost of the existing industry; certified domestic sections reduce the import content of public investment. The policy agenda that follows is modest in fiscal cost: clarify and regularise trade instruments, extend standards, use procurement intelligently, focus incentives where the gap lies, and publish the data that investors and policymakers need.

10.10 A sequenced agenda

The levers can be sequenced over the period covered by this paper. In 2026 and 2027, the priorities are data and standards: an annual national steel balance, publication of the steel lines of the harmonised tariff, extension of mandatory certification to structural steel and payment discipline in public works. From 2027 to 2030, the priorities are the trade and incentive framework: transparent instruments to replace the open-ended ban, correction of inverted tariff escalation at the CEMAC level, incentives focused on melting and section rolling, and practical arrangements for local-transformation clauses in mining conventions. Beyond 2030, as ore and gas projects mature, policy can turn to the long-term question of ore-based iron in Cameroon. Throughout, the goal is the one set by SND30: import substitution together with exports, in a sector the strategy itself names as a priority [S25].