只有培育供应商而不仅是给予优先，本地成分才能放大钢厂的就业效应

6.1 What a steelworks buys

A steelworks’ purchases fall into four groups with very different local potential.

• Metallic charge and energy. Scrap, DRI or hot-briquetted iron and electricity are the largest operating costs of an EAF works. They come from wherever the metallics and the power are; in the long term, Cameroonian iron ore reduced to DRI and Cameroonian hydropower are the largest local-content opportunity of all, but they are industrial projects in their own right rather than supply contracts.
• Process consumables. Graphite electrodes, refractories, ferro-alloys, lime, industrial gases, rolls and spare parts. Most are imported today; some, such as lime, aggregates and gases produced on site, can be local; others, such as refractory installation and roll repair, have a local service component even when the material is imported.
• Services. Mechanical and electrical maintenance, machining and repair, laboratory testing, cleaning, catering, security, transport, port handling, IT and training. These are labour-intensive and largely localisable.
• Capital works. Civil works, buildings, steel structures, erection and installation in each construction phase. Local firms can take a large share if packages are sized to their capacity.

Figure 6.1 sets out illustrative objectives for the share of each category that could be placed with Cameroonian-registered suppliers in the first and fifth years of operation. The objectives are not commitments; they show where supplier development can change outcomes and where it cannot in the short term.

Source: Cameroon Steel analysis. Objectives, not commitments or forecasts; method in Annex A.

6.2 Category by category

The categories in Figure 6.1 differ in what local suppliers need in order to qualify.

• Catering, cleaning and security are labour-intensive services that Cameroonian firms already provide to industry. Qualification is mainly a question of hygiene, safety and labour-law compliance, and of paying staff properly; these services can be almost entirely local from the start.
• Road haulage and port handling are also largely local today, but steel brings heavy and long loads, strict delivery windows and high safety standards for loading and securing. Haulage firms need vehicle standards, driver training and fatigue management to qualify.
• Civil works and building materials can be local if construction packages are sized to the capacity of Cameroonian contractors, and if cement, aggregates and reinforcing steel are bought locally where they meet the specifications.
• Mechanical maintenance and electrical installation require certified welders, electrical authorisations, method statements and quality documentation. They are the categories where supplier development changes outcomes most, and where trained technicians from the plant’s own programmes can create their own firms.
• Machining, roll and spare-part repair need machine tools, metrology and metallurgical knowledge. Douala’s engineering workshops are the starting point; the step up is in precision, documentation and turnaround time.
• Lime, aggregates and slag handling depend on geology and logistics as much as on skills. Steel slag, a by-product, can become a local input for road and construction aggregates, creating a supply chain that runs from the plant outwards.
• Industrial gases, refractories, ferro-alloys and graphite electrodes are specialised, capital-intensive or imported products. Local content in these categories will come first from services, such as operating an on-site oxygen plant or relining furnaces and ladles, rather than from manufacturing.

6.3 Cameroon’s legal framework now ties incentives to local content

Cameroon’s legal framework for local content has been strengthened in three steps since 2023 (Table 6.1). The most important for an industrial investor is Ordinance No. 2025/002 of 18 July 2025 fixing investment incentives, ratified by Law No. 2025/015 of 17 December 2025, which replaced the 2013 investment-incentives law [S36][S37].

The 2013 law it replaced had already listed the iron and steel industry among the priority sectors eligible for specific incentives [S63], and in December 2025 the Prime Minister set up a committee on the integration of mining and metallurgy whose mandate includes the supply of iron ore to local steelmakers [S64]. Under article 6 of the ordinance, any investor seeking incentives must produce "a programme for developing local skills and transferring technology, a plan for the priority recruitment of Cameroonian workers and for priority recourse to local subcontractors and contractors" (Cameroon Steel translation), together with proof that the investment is financed [S36]. Under article 7, a new project must meet at least two of a list of criteria, which include creating direct jobs for Cameroonians at a threshold of at least one job per FCFA 50 million of planned investment, taking local subcontracting into account; for industrial projects, using national natural resources for at least 50% of the value of inputs (excluding labour, water, energy and telecommunications) unless they are unavailable; increasing value added by at least 30%; and exporting at least 25% of turnover [S36]. The ordinance provides for the control of commitments, including the jobs created, and allows the investment convention to be revoked if commitments are not met [S36].

Table 6.1 Cameroonian legal provisions on local employment, skills and suppliers relevant to a steelworks

Source: as listed. Translations and summaries by Cameroon Steel; the original French texts prevail.

The Mining Code does not apply to a steelworks itself, which holds no mining title. It matters for two reasons. First, its local-content chapter is the most detailed statement of what the Cameroonian State expects from large resource investors, and the same expectations are now generalised by the investment ordinance. Second, it links the ore supply chain to local industry: by requiring that mining conventions dedicate at least 15% of production to local transformation [S35], it creates the legal basis for Cameroonian ore to be processed into iron and steel in Cameroon. Cameroon Steel’s sister company, Cameroon Mining Company, holds the Mbalam exploitation permit [S09].

6.4 Preference is not capability

Legal preference for Cameroonian suppliers solves only half the problem. A preference rule can oblige a buyer to choose a local firm when one is qualified; it cannot make a firm qualified. In heavy industry, the gap is usually in four areas: health and safety systems, quality assurance and documentation, technical capacity for specific tasks, and the working capital to finance contracts paid in arrears. A local maintenance contractor that cannot produce a method statement, a lifting plan or a certified welder will not be allowed on a steel plant site, whatever the law says.

Supplier development closes that gap through a sequence of steps (Figure 6.2). A supplier registers and provides basic legal, tax and safety documents; it is audited for capability and agrees a gap plan; it receives a small, low-risk pilot order under close supervision; it is coached on safety, quality and finance, and paid faster while it grows; it becomes an approved supplier under a framework contract with a performance scorecard; and, at the top of the ladder, it sells to other industries in the zone and the region.

Source: Cameroon Steel proposal.

Each rung combines a test and a reward. The test protects the plant; the reward, a larger order, faster payment or a longer contract, gives the supplier a reason to invest. The two most effective rewards for small Cameroonian firms are often the least expensive for the buyer: predictable volumes, so the firm can hire and train, and payment within agreed terms, so it does not finance the buyer with borrowed money.

6.5 Dangote Cement: local procurement rose while the company reported investing in suppliers

The best-documented African example close to Cameroon’s situation is Dangote Cement, which operates in Nigeria and ten other African countries, including Cameroon [S42]. Its 2025 annual report states that local procurement reached ₦1,719 billion, 82% of total procurement, up from 75% in 2024 and 72% in 2023 (Figure 6.3) [S42]. The share thus rose from 72% to 82% between 2023 and 2025, a period in which the company reports investing in supplier development; the shares are computed on naira amounts, and the effect of exchange-rate changes on them is not separated, so the rise cannot be attributed to supplier development alone. The company describes engaging local small and medium enterprises for quarry services, packaging materials, logistics, catering and facility maintenance across its African operations, and, in Nigeria, supporting haulage operators, block moulders, retailers, artisans and maintenance service providers with capacity-building on health and safety standards, technical training for contractors and mechanics, and stable off-take arrangements [S42].

Two points in the Dangote evidence matter for a steelworks. First, local procurement is reported as a share of total spend, year by year, with the method stated in the company’s sustainability reporting; that is the discipline that makes a local-content claim credible. Second, the categories it reports localising are the same as those in Figure 6.1: logistics, catering, facility maintenance and site services, and more technical maintenance. A cement plant is not a steelworks, but its supply chain for services, maintenance and logistics is similar.

6.6 Cameroon already has a supplier base to build on

Cameroon’s steel and metalworking sector is not starting from nothing. Its producers and processors, grouped in professional associations, were reported in May 2026 to account for about 5,000 jobs and about FCFA 500 billion of turnover [S08]. Douala has rolling mills, wire drawers, mesh makers, fabricators and engineering workshops with experience of industrial maintenance. Kribi itself is acquiring an industrial base: the KPIZ zone plans clusters in wood processing and logistics, steelmaking linked to mineral exports, petrochemicals, agro-industry and construction materials [S38], with a first-phase development programme of €400 million out of €795 million planned, to be financed with the African Development Bank, the European Union and the International Finance Corporation [S39].

For a steelworks, these firms are both potential suppliers and potential customers. Fabricators and wire drawers buy bar and rod; machine shops can repair rolls, guides and spare parts; engineering firms can maintain cranes, hydraulics and electrical systems; and construction-materials producers can use steel slag as aggregate, a by-product that a works must find outlets for. A supplier-development programme run at the scale of the zone, rather than of a single plant, would spread the cost of audits, coaching and certification across several buyers and give suppliers a larger market to grow into.

6.7 Measuring local content honestly

Local-content figures are easy to inflate. A purchase from a Cameroonian-registered trading company that imports a finished product counts as "local" in many reports, but it creates few jobs and little value in Cameroon. A credible reporting framework distinguishes at least four measures:

• Spend with Cameroonian-registered suppliers, as a share of total procurement, by category.
• Spend with Cameroonian-owned small and medium enterprises, and with firms based in the South Region.
• Local value added, estimated as the share of each contract’s value that pays for work, materials and services produced in Cameroon.
• Supplier capability outcomes: number of firms audited, coached, approved and certified, and the jobs and training at those firms.

Cameroon Steel’s proposed objectives for the share of spend placed locally are shown in Figure 6.1; Chapter 10 proposes that the cluster publish a common local-content report for the KPIZ zone, using these four measures, so that progress can be compared across employers and over time.

6.8 Risks and how to manage them

Supplier development carries risks that must be managed openly. The first is safety and quality: an under-qualified contractor on a steel plant site is a danger to its own workers and to others, so no local preference should override the safety and quality gates on the ladder. The second is cost: local suppliers may at first be more expensive than imports, and the price difference should be treated as a time-limited development cost with an exit date, not a permanent subsidy. The third is integrity: lists of preferred suppliers attract rent-seeking, so qualification criteria, audit results and contract awards should be documented and auditable, with a grievance channel for firms that are refused. The fourth is dependence: small firms that rely on a single large buyer are fragile, which is another reason to develop them at the scale of the zone and to help them sell to other industries in Cameroon and the Central African region.

Handled in this way, local content becomes what the 2025 ordinance intends: not a quota to be reported, but a channel through which the skills built inside the plant spread into the economy around it.